By Cenap Çakmak and Murat Ustaoğlu
Introductory Note
On an unexpected full-scale move, major armed groups that claimed to be legitimate opposition were able to topple the long-standing Assad regime and take political control in the country within a strikingly short period of time. There is cautious optimism both among the Syrians, particularly those who have been brutalized under the previous regime, as well as within the international community. Many questions remain to be addressed, including as to how the state and nation should be rebuilt, whether radicalism and extremism will reign in the future of the country, and whether political stability will ever be maintained. Any analysis that claims to offer insights into the new state of affairs in the country needs to acknowledge the fact that there are a vast number of uncertainties, particularly in terms of the composition of the opposition forces, their true intentions and of whether their rule will be endorsed by the regional powers, international institutions and the large segments of the Syrian society.
The authors, hoping to contribute to the potential discussions on these major questions, summarize their findings that they believe are relevant to the ongoing process, based on a comprehensive research study they conducted during the initial years of the Syrian uprisings, with the participation of political and social opposition groups. We feel that we need to caution that the opposition groups whose views are analytically presented here may not be the exact groups which now claims victory in their impressive march to Damascus. However, it is safe for us to argue that these were the views of genuine Syrian groups on the future of Syria after Assad.
Against this background, this analysis presents the prospects and challenges in the process of rebuilding a Syrian national and constitutional identity in the aftermath of the civil war. Based on extensive field work and elite survey involving leading figures of diverse members of Syrian national coalition, an umbrella initiative of opposition groups fighting against Assad regime, the study critically evaluates the challenges ahead as well as the inherent advantages for the post-conflict era in Syria. The findings in the study can be used to construct a working state identity that would address the priorities and concerns of the majority of opposition groups.
Construction of National Identity in the Aftermath of Civil War
The questions asked to the leading opposition figures include those regarding how national identity would be reconstructed after the end of civil war. To this end, participants in the project were asked the following question: “Is it possible to create a national identity that would serve as a common denominator among the constituent peoples and groups in Syria? What should be the basis of this identity?” The most crucial issue in relation to the question is the source of a common identity that would serve as a linkage and tie between diverse social groups in the future Syria. The responses to this question show that generalizations for Middle Eastern affairs may not be particularly applicable to the Syrian case. Almost all opposition figures stated that there is a common identity of Syrianship that would unite the people; there seems to be agreement on this matter. Some of the participants even note that the opposition in fact does not intend to create an entirely new Syria. This emphasis is interesting because it shows that despite the dramatic and tragic developments in the country, the perception of a unified Syria has not been damaged terribly.
Unlike expectations, Arab identity and/or Islam is not referenced by opposition groups as determinative elements in the reconstruction of a Syrian identity. Opposition figures and groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, known for its religious references, emphasize Syrianship identity rather than a Sunni or Arab identity as a common denominator among the people, which does not indicate, of course, that Islam or Arab identity is not considered important. For instance, a Christian participant noted that he was not a Muslim but grew up in a Muslim community under the influence of Islamic culture, suggesting that Islam inevitably influences Syrian culture and identity. It should also be noted that the Turkmens, although aligned with the opposition forces, strongly emphasize that their “national” (or ethnic) identity should be preserved and recognized in the new Syrian state construction.r.
This agreement among the opposition groups offers some insights for the future. Despite visible diversity among opposition groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, Christians and Turkmens, the opposition is able to reach an agreement on a commonly held roadmap that is free of extremism and radicalism and embraces all religious, ethnic and racial identities. Aware of the diversity in the country, the opposition groups do not see this diversity as a fault line for Syria. The participants, referring to a history of tolerance and coexistence in Syria, are also aware that ambition by any group toward domination would be inconclusive. Therefore, these groups agree that preserving diversity in the country is the greatest assurance for their survival and stability. From this perspective, it might actually be argued that the opposition figures are simply being pragmatic. However, in this case, pragmatism has a constructive connotation in the current situation.
Of course, a constructive and positive stance on rebuilding a common identity does not eliminate all problems. The findings based on the analysis of the views expressed by the opposition figures reveal certain potential problems that may affect post-conflict Syria. The greatest challenge is the uncertainty as to when the conflict will be truly over. Opposition figures believe that the conflict is against the spirit of the revolution and further believe that Assad drove them to war. The continuation of the conflict disrupts the common identity of Syrianship and is destroying the common ground that might generate a common Syrian identity in the future.
Another major problem is the emergence of different spheres of authority in different parts of the country. Although there is an ongoing battle between the opposition groups and Assad forces, there are many other groups clashing in Syrian territories. Of course, the presence of foreign fighters in the country is one root cause of this problem, but the entire situation on the ground is far more complicated than the one posed by extremist groups and proxy factions. As noted by the participants, even small groups may declare autonomy in the country, which exacerbates the instability of the situation, creating small areas dominated by different authorities. This situation contributes to the argument being raised since the start of the conflict that the country may be divided into several parts along sectarian and ethnic lines. At this point, it should be noted that although a sense of unity and a common sense of Syrianship is a historical legacy, Syria was once divided into four parts by the Treaty of Sykes-Picot. For this reason, the opposition groups must expend considerable effort to maintain a united and integrated Syria.
Debates Regarding National Identity in Syria
Before determining the grounds upon which national unity in Syria should be based, we must discuss the meaning of nation or national in the Arabic language. The term nation in English literally means millet in Arabic language. However, there are also many other notions in Arabic referring to “nation”, including “kavmiyye”, “milla”, “asabiyya”, “şa’b” and “vataniyye”. It appears that “vataniyye” is the term that should be considered for the reconstruction of a new Syria. The meaning of “vataniyye” has been shaped over a long process that began with the intellectual efforts of Butros Bustani in the 19th century. The term emphasizes a national Syrian identity based on territorial allegiance. The term that conflicts with “vataniyye” is “taifiyye”, which refers to sectarian allegiance and affinity. The problem here is which will be preferred in the reconstruction of Syria. In other words, it is crucial to determine which concept will be taken into account when a new state is redefined and reconstructed.
The participant groups recall the idea that pluralistic democracy that is built upon ethnic or religious identities is a model offered for a transitional democracy in the Arab Middle East. In fact, this model was implemented in Lebanon after the Ottoman domination; however, this model failed to prevent the power struggle and competition between the different ethnic and sectarian groups in the country and led to the most fragile structure in the Middle East characterized by political instability and social clashes. The sectarian model in Lebanon in which all sectarian identities are preserved under the constitution and public positions are allocated in consideration of the population size of the sectarian groups failed in practice because consensus was not achieved in the country among the groups, political parties remained under the control of leading sectarian figures and the demands of the disadvantaged groups were not met. These problems and failures have led to lasting crisis in the country. The Lebanese experience clearly shows that a sectarian model is not a good choice for Syria.
This is why ideally, the opposition groups suggest that introducing constitutional citizenship based on a Syrian identity characterized by territorial allegiance is the best option for the future of Syria. Despite religious diversity in the country, some progress has been made on this model since the 19th century; this progress enabled the diverse groups to have a sense and an experience of coexistence. The social and economic change in independent Syria since the 1950s and the emergence of an urban middle class involving all social groups contributed considerably to the consolidation of a Syrian identity. In addition, the new generation in the 1990s paid allegiance to a national identity rather than sectarian and religious identities in a globalized world. Although sectarian and religious allegiance and identity still matters in rural parts of Syria, it should be recalled that it is the urban middle class and professionals that will rebuild a democratic Syria.
One of the requirements and conditions for a Syrian identity based on constitutional citizenship to work effectively within the state organization is, of course, the introduction of secularism. In the modern history of Syria, religion has always been a source of legitimacy for political administrations and opposition groups to justify various political stances. For Syrian nationalists, particularly the Baath Party, Islam has been considered a cultural element that emphasizes a common past and maintains social unity, but its effectiveness should be evaluated within a secular setting. Islam has been used as a major tool to legitimize and regulate state-society relations. Syrian nationalist leaders have even encouraged the emergence of a new class of clerics that would support the state’s secularization and modernization program. Thus, it is no coincidence that a number of Sunni clerics or Christian religious leaders have aligned themselves with the regime during the civil war. However, the Baath administration has also viewed political Islam as a major threat because it was considered as a counter and rival ideology that sought to create an Islamic regime and change the status quo. For political Islamist Syrian opposition, Islam is an important political object and a key in the political transformation in the country. However, conservative Muslim circles in Syria have adopted different strands of Islam, ranging from radical Salafism to Sufi tradition.
In the pluralist opposition setting in Syria, almost every group views itself as a major actor in the new Syrian political system. However, for the opposition groups that have different meanings for Islam, the best Islam is the one they interpret. For religious and sectarian minorities, including Christians, the Druze and Ismailis, a Sunni state structure based on a political Islamist approach embodies a threat. Secular Sunnis will also react to a state structure based on a religious system, such as the system implemented in Saudi Arabia. For this reason, it is necessary for the Syrian opposition to use secularism as a reference to ensure that all groups feel safe and secure in the new system. A past culture of coexistence may contribute to achieving stability in the country if it is backed by a secular state definition and approach..
*Based on research findings, presented in the authors’ book, Post-Conflict Syrian State and Nation Building: Economic and Political Development (New York: Palgrave, 2015).
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