The Legal Framework for the Use of Force: Is There an Order? (Part IV)

By Cenap Çakmak

Historically, the use of force has passed through all three of these legal forms. It has evolved from a largely permissive and decentralized practice, where the resort to armed force was viewed as a natural attribute of sovereignty, to an increasingly constrained legal sphere shaped by collective security aspirations and institutional oversight, and finally to a contemporary framework defined by intense normative constraints grounded in the UN Charter system. This historical trajectory is not merely linear; it also reflects the evolving concepts of the international order itself: from power-based coexistence to rules-based coordination, and toward an increasingly explicit claim that unilateral violence is prohibited by rules.

Against this backdrop, the fundamental question is whether contemporary law regarding the use of force truly establishes a rules-based international order, or whether it remains structurally dependent on political authorization, selective enforcement, and uneven institutional capacity. While Article 2(4) of the UN Charter formally prohibits the use of force and the United Nations’ collective security system provides a clear institutional framework for its implementation, the operational reality of this regime consistently raises doubts regarding the completeness and autonomy of the legal order in this area. Consequently, the law of the use of force holds a particularly distinctive position within international law: it is both one of the most explicitly codified regimes and one of the most politically contested.

From Authorization to Regulation

For much of recorded international history, the use of force fell entirely within the realm of permission. War was not an exceptional or legally restricted act, but rather an accepted and generally legitimate instrument of state governance. Sovereignty, in the classical sense, encompassed not only territorial authority and political independence but also the discretion to determine when and how to resort to armed force. In this context, war was often perceived as an extension of foreign policy—a view later famously articulated by Carl von Clausewitz—and did not require prior authorization from any higher authority. States, as the primary and de facto sole actors in the international system, operated within a permissive legal environment where the use of force was neither categorically prohibited nor institutionally regulated.

However, this permissive order was not without structure. While the law did not meaningfully restrict the decision to go to war (jus ad bellum), certain normative and practical considerations—such as the traditions of just war, diplomatic conventions, and evolving expectations regarding conduct—provided some guidance, albeit limited. Nevertheless, these proved insufficient to prevent recurring large-scale conflicts, particularly in the absence of a central enforcement mechanism or binding legal prohibitions.

By the nineteenth century, the destabilizing consequences of unrestricted warfare led more explicitly to the emergence of regulatory approaches. The balance-of-power doctrine aimed to prevent the dominance of a single state by maintaining a relative equilibrium among the great powers. This logic found institutional expression in the Concert of Europe established following the Congress of Vienna. The Concert of Europe system introduced a form of collective political governance in which the great powers engaged in regular consultation and coordination to preserve stability and ensure that conflicts were brought under control before escalating into a general war.

What is significant is that this shift did not transform the legal status of war from being permitted to being prohibited. Rather, it overlaid the permissive legal framework with a layer of political regulation. War remained legal, but the use of war became increasingly subject to strategic calculations within a managed international order. The Concert of Europe, which contributed to a relatively long period of peace among the great powers for much of the nineteenth century, demonstrates how regulatory mechanisms can mitigate excesses without fundamentally altering the legal character of a permissive system.

In this sense, the transition from a system of permission to a system of regulation represents a critical intermediate stage in the evolution of the law of the use of force. While this transition reflects an awareness of the systemic risks inherent in unlimited sovereignty, it has not yet reached the stage of imposing binding legal constraints. Thus, although the emerging practices of coordination and balance began to shape the conditions under which power was exercised, the permissive foundation of the previous order persisted.

The impulse toward regulation that emerged in the nineteenth century did not disappear with the collapse of the Concert of Europe; rather, it was reformulated and intensified following World War I. The destruction on an unprecedented scale gave rise to a renewed determination to move beyond the war’s purely political management toward a more structured—albeit still incomplete—legal constraint on the use of force. Nevertheless, this period should be understood not as a definitive break, but as an ambitious and ultimately fragile transition from regulation to constraint.

The establishment of the League of Nations marked the first serious attempt to embed restrictions on the use of force within an institutionalized legal framework. The Covenant of the League of Nations did not categorically prohibit war, but aimed to condition and delay the resort to war. Member states were required to submit disputes to arbitration, judicial resolution, or investigation by the Council before resorting to force, and to comply with the waiting periods established to create time for a diplomatic solution. In this sense, the League of Nations introduced elements of restriction into an area that had previously been largely unrestricted and politically regulated.

However, the League of Nations’ framework suffered from serious structural weaknesses. Its effectiveness depended largely on the political will of its members, particularly the great powers, and it lacked robust enforcement mechanisms. The absence of key actors at critical moments, combined with divergent strategic interests, undermined the reliability of collective security. As a result, while the League of Nations’ restrictive objectives remained normatively significant, they remained limited in practice and ultimately failed to prevent the resumption of large-scale conflict.

Parallel to the League of Nations system, more targeted legal and diplomatic instruments sought to further regulate the use of force, typically within more limited or selective frameworks. The Locarno Treaties exemplify this trend. Centered on Western Europe, these agreements aimed to secure borders and renounce the use of force among specific states, particularly Germany, France, and Belgium. While they contributed to a temporary stabilization of relations and fostered a sense of compromise, their geographically and politically limited scope revealed a fragmented approach to regulating war; this approach was applied primarily to willing and strategically compatible partners.

The Kellogg–Briand Pact represented a more ambitious, yet similarly limited, initiative. By declaring the renunciation of war as a tool of national policy, this pact signaled a significant normative shift aimed at undermining the legitimacy of aggressive force. However, despite broad official participation, the pact lacked implementing provisions and clear definitions, rendering it largely a matter of aspiration. States retained significant interpretive flexibility, particularly by invoking claims of self-defense, which limited the pact’s practical impact.

Taken as a whole, developments during the interwar period reflect a significant yet incomplete movement toward restriction. These developments demonstrate a growing awareness that the permissive and loosely regulated use of force creates systemic risks and that more formalized legal constraints are necessary. At the same time, reliance on partial consensus, selective participation, and weak enforcement mechanisms meant that these initiatives did not fully eliminate the underlying permissive logic. Instead, they produced a layered and uneven legal landscape where, despite a clear desire for a rules-based order in the use of force, such an order remained unfulfilled.

The UN Charter and Restraint

The UN Charter signaled the strongest shift toward restraint. The post-1945 legal framework, based on the incomplete and ultimately fragile interwar-era experiments, aimed to resolve the security dilemma—a long-standing enigma underlying the international system. If states, acting under conditions of uncertainty and self-reliance, retained unlimited discretion regarding the use of force, mutual distrust would persist, and recurring conflicts would remain structurally entrenched. The Charter system responded by establishing a bold legal premise: ensuring the stability of the international order through the prohibition of unilateral use of force.

At the heart of this transformation lies the United Nations Security Council, designed as the institutional mechanism through which decisions regarding the legitimate use of force would be collectively approved. This represented a clear break from both the tolerant logic of classical sovereignty and the loosely coordinated regulatory practices of earlier periods. The general rule is clear: pursuant to Article 2(4) of the Charter, the unilateral use of force is prohibited. In principle, states no longer possess the right to resort to war as a policy tool; instead, the authority to identify threats to peace and order enforcement measures has been centralized in the Security Council.

This framework constitutes the legal pinnacle of restrictive international law. Unlike previous regulations, this framework establishes a comprehensive normative prohibition combined with an institutional structure designed to operationalize collective security. The aim is not merely to manage or delay conflict, but to transform the legal status of force—from a right based on discretionary authority into a limited and exceptional measure subject to collective adjudication.

However, the Charter system does not eliminate all forms of authorization or regulation. Rather, it places them within a predominantly restrictive framework. Most importantly, the inherent right to self-defense recognized in Article 51 preserves a narrowly defined sphere in which states may legally resort to force without prior authorization, but only under conditions of necessity and proportionality, and subject to subsequent review by the Security Council. Similarly, the Council’s own practices frequently reflect elements of political negotiation and strategic balancing, echoing previous regulatory logics within a more formalized legal framework.

These entrenched flexibilities reveal an ongoing tension at the heart of the Charter regime. While the prohibition on the use of force represents a clear normative commitment to a rules-based international order, its implementation remains dependent on political consensus among major powers and the effective functioning of collective security mechanisms. Consequently, the contemporary legal framework simultaneously concretizes restrictions, incorporates regulated exceptions, and, in practice, occasionally reopens areas of de facto permission. This layered structure underscores both the ambition and the limitations of the Charter system in fully resolving the problem it was designed to address.

Security Council Authorization: Regulation

The prohibition on the use of force contained in the Charter does not function in isolation; this prohibition is complemented by an institutional mechanism designed to interpret, apply, and, when necessary, enforce it. This signifies a transition from a general rule of restraint to an institutional practice of regulation. At the center of this regulatory framework is the United Nations Security Council, which, under the Charter, has the authority to determine when peace is under threat and to authorize collective action.

The Charter explicitly grants the Council the authority to identify threats and determine measures. Pursuant to Article 39, the Security Council decides what measures shall be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security. This provision is fundamental: by granting the Council the authority to interpret the scope and meaning of threats, it enables the Council to adapt the legal framework to changing circumstances. In doing so, the Council does not merely apply pre-existing rules; in practice, it actively shapes the content of those rules.

Once such a decision is made, Articles 41 and 42 provide the Council with a range of intervention options. Article 41 authorizes non-coercive measures, including economic sanctions, diplomatic restrictions, and other forms of coercion other than the use of armed force. Should these prove insufficient, Article 42 permits the Council to take action “by air, sea, or land forces, as may be deemed necessary” to restore peace and security. Collectively, these provisions establish a graduated system of application in which the use of force is not eliminated but rather centralized and subject to collective authority.

This institutional framework reflects a distinct regulatory logic. The law does not merely prohibit the use of force; it channels legitimate force through structured decision-making processes. Thus, the Security Council performs a dual function: it interprets the scope of the prohibition and determines when exceptions in the form of collective sanctions are justified. In this sense, the Council transforms the abstract norm of prohibition into a functional collective security system aimed at replacing unilateral use of force with coordinated and institutionally sanctioned actions.

The result is a framework that, while differing from traditional alliance-based models, can be understood as a form of collective defense. The system of rules does not allow states to act independently to safeguard their security interests but instead places primary responsibility in the hands of a central authority. At the same time, the effectiveness of this regulatory framework is closely linked to the political dynamics within the Council itself, particularly the harmony—or discord—among its permanent members. Therefore, while the Charter establishes a clear legal pathway for the authorization and use of force, its practical operation continues to reflect the interplay between legal norms and geopolitical realities.

Article 51: Self-Defense: Authorization Within Limits

Despite the Charter’s aim to centralize authority over the use of force and alleviate the structural pressures of the security dilemma, this dilemma has never been fully resolved. States continue to operate in an environment of uncertainty, where reliance on collective mechanisms—no matter how formally robust—may not always provide timely or effective protection. The framework of self-defense thus emerges as a necessary yet inherently problematic component of the legal order in this context.

Article 51 of the UN Charter safeguards the “natural right” to self-defense in the event of an armed attack.

This provision is not an oversight but a deliberate and pragmatic concession. Without this provision, states would be legally powerless in the face of an attack and would be forced to wait for collective authority that might be delayed or blocked. Thus, self-defense functions as a necessary exception to the general prohibition on the use of force and ensures that the legal framework remains responsive to the realities of international insecurity.

At the same time, self-defense is the most important entry point for obtaining authorization within a system that would otherwise be restrictive. Unlike the centralized and collective authority of the Security Council, the exercise of the right to self-defense is fundamentally decentralized. States retain primary authority in assessing under what conditions force may be used. This involves determining whether an armed attack has occurred, whether the use of force is necessary, whether it is proportionate, and—in more contentious formulations—whether a threat is sufficiently imminent to justify preventive action. This decentralized structure creates a legally recognized scope of authorization within the Charter regime. Although the doctrine is formally limited by conditions such as necessity and proportionality, as well as the obligation to report taken measures to the United Nations Security Council, these limitations are initially interpreted and applied largely by states. Consequently, the line between legitimate self-defense and unlawful use of force is often open to debate.

The consequences of this are significant. This provision, designed as a narrow exception to protect states’ fundamental security, simultaneously creates a structural loophole with a high potential for abuse. Broad interpretations of what constitutes an “armed attack,” the flexible application of the concept of proximity, and the flexible application of the principles of necessity and proportionality have, at times, allowed states to legitimize uses of force that do not align well with the Charter’s restrictive logic. In this sense, self-defense embodies an ongoing tension within the legal framework: it is indispensable for preserving the system’s reliability under conditions of insecurity, yet it simultaneously reopens the highly permissive dynamics that the prohibition on the use of force seeks to overcome. Accordingly, the law of self-defense demonstrates both the resilience and the fragility of the rule-based order in this domain. This confirms that even in its most restrictive form, the legal framework cannot entirely eliminate the role of unilateral decision-making regarding the use of force. Instead, it accepts this reality at the cost of reintroducing uncertainty and debate into the system’s core.

Finding Exceptions to the Exception Regarding Unilateral Use of Force: How the Self-Defense Framework is Abused to Legitimize Acts of Aggression

Originally designed as a narrow exception within a restrictive legal framework, the self-defense regime has, in practice, created its own exceptions, thereby establishing a zone of permissibility within the Charter’s framework. This transformation is neither accidental nor isolated; rather, it reflects states’ ongoing efforts to expand the interpretive boundaries of Article 51 in the face of shifting threat perceptions and strategic interests.

One of the most significant developments in this context has been the growing reliance on preventive—or, more accurately, preemptive—self-defense doctrines. While classical interpretations of self-defense, often associated with the Caroline Case, emphasize urgency and necessity in the face of an imminent attack, contemporary practice has significantly relaxed these requirements. The distinction between “imminent” and “potential” threats has blurred, enabling states to justify the use of force not only in response to an ongoing or clearly approaching attack but also against speculative or long-term risks. This doctrinal shift effectively expands the scope of “ ” within the legal framework and permits unilateral threat assessments to replace collective authorization.

The most prominent example of this expansion is the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The intervention was justified, among other reasons, on the basis of alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and their potential use. Although framed in the language of self-defense and global security, the absence of an actual or imminent armed attack—and the subsequent failure to substantiate the WMD claims—revealed the doctrine’s flexibility. Here, self-defense was not only interpreted broadly but was also effectively restructured to accommodate a preventive logic that does not align well with the Charter’s restrictive intent.

Parallel to the evolution of the concept of terrorism, an equally significant expansion has emerged. In the post-Cold War era, and particularly in the post-9/11 context, states have increasingly invoked the right to self-defense in response to non-state actors engaged in cross-border activities. While the recognition that large-scale terrorist attacks can trigger the right to self-defense represents a significant doctrinal development, the absence of a universally accepted definition of terrorism has created significant uncertainty. The broad and sometimes vague characterizations of terrorist threats have allowed states to include a wide variety of actors and situations within the scope of self-defense.

This flexibility, in turn, has facilitated a “one-size-fits-all” justification: a legal narrative capable of encompassing various uses of force under the umbrella of counterterrorism. Military operations against broadly defined networks, preemptive strikes against suspected threats, and long-term campaigns on foreign soil have all been legitimized through a broad interpretation of the concept of self-defense. In many cases, the thresholds of necessity, proportionality, and urgency have been interpreted quite flexibly, reinforcing the permissive nature of the framework.

What is significant is that this evolution did not occur in a legal vacuum. The response—or lack thereof—from the broader international community has played a significant role in reinforcing these practices. While some cases have drawn criticism, a sustained and unified opposition has generally been absent. The consistent failure to object to broad or controversial self-defense practices has contributed to a form of tacit recognition, even if not explicitly acknowledged. Over time, this has lent a degree of legitimacy to practices deviating from the Charter’s original restrictive design.

The pattern emerging from states’ practices demonstrates that the evolution of the concept of self-defense cannot be understood merely as a matter of legal interpretation; it is also a function of strategic behavior shaped by realpolitik concerns. Faced with ongoing uncertainty regarding collective security mechanisms and a lack of balanced trust, states have increasingly acted based on unilateral risk assessments and prioritized national security calculations rather than strictly adhering to the Charter’s restrictive framework. In doing so, they have not merely operated within the boundaries of the law but have actively expanded and, at times, reshaped those boundaries.

A fundamental feature of these dynamics is the instrumental use of legal justification. The rhetoric of self-defense has become a strategic resource through which states frame and legitimize actions that would otherwise be considered unlawful. Rather than explicitly challenging the prohibition on the use of force, states tend to expand its exceptions while invoking it. This practice reflects a kind of “interpretive opportunism” in which legal norms are not rejected but are selectively reinterpreted to align with perceived security imperatives. The result is the gradual normalization of broader and more flexible interpretations of the concept of self-defense, typically without any formal change or explicit doctrinal consensus.

The role of terrorism in this process has been particularly significant. As a category, terrorism is both politically potent and legally ambiguous; this provides states with significant flexibility in defining threats and identifying targets. By framing a wide range of security issues within the counterterrorism paradigm, states have been able to apply the concept of self-defense in contexts extending far beyond its original scope. This includes operations against non-state actors on foreign soil, the use of preemptive force based on intelligence assessments, and prolonged military conflicts justified as ongoing defensive measures. In many cases, the lack of clear boundaries regarding time, geography, or operational scope has further blurred the distinction between defense and coercive intervention.

At the same time, the institutional framework designed to oversee such practices has remained inconsistent in its responses. Although the United Nations Security Council holds the official central authority on matters of peace and security, it has generally been constrained by political divisions among its permanent members. This situation has limited the capacity to consistently assess, approve, or reject claims of self-defense, thereby leaving a significant interpretive space in the hands of individual states. In the absence of authoritative and timely institutional clarity, state practices begin to shape the boundaries of the law on their own.

Over time, these developments have contributed to a subtle yet significant shift in the legal landscape. What was originally designed as a strictly limited exception has, through practice, gradually evolved into a more flexible and permissive doctrine. The cumulative effect of repeated unilateral actions—justified by a broad interpretation of the concept of self-defense and meeting with limited resistance—has eroded the restrictive essence of the Charter regime. In this sense, the sphere of restriction has not officially disappeared, but has been functionally diluted by the emergence of a parallel sphere of permission.

This transformation highlights a broader tension within the international legal order. While the Charter framework aims to restrict the use of force through clear rules and central authority, its effectiveness ultimately depends on the willingness of states to internalize and uphold these restrictions. In situations dominated by strategic imperatives and where institutional responses remain fragmented, legal norms risk becoming tools of justification rather than instruments of restraint. Thus, the evolution of self-defense demonstrates that, in practice, the boundaries between restraint and authorization are not fixed but are constantly renegotiated through the interplay of law, politics, and power.

In summary, the concept—originally designed as a carefully limited exception—has gradually been transformed into a renewed source of authorization. Through doctrines such as the strategic invocation of vague threats and the broad definition of terrorism, states have effectively created “exceptions to the exception.” This “ ” dynamic highlights a fundamental paradox of the legal framework governing the use of force: even in its most restrictive form, it contains the seeds of its own erosion. The persistence of the security dilemma, combined with the decentralized nature of the concept of self-defense and the international community’s ambivalent response, has facilitated the reemergence of a permissive space that calls into question the consistency and reliability of the rules-based international order in this domain.

Institutional Failure and Expanding Permissiveness

When the United Nations Security Council is unable to act due to veto paralysis, the restrictive framework weakens. In such situations, states increasingly turn to doctrines that reopen permissions such as humanitarian intervention, the responsibility to protect, intervention upon invitation, collective self-defense, and preventive or preemptive strikes. These developments do not abolish the law. Rather, they demonstrate how institutional inadequacy transforms restrictive law into a permissive practice.

The system of rules assumes that the Security Council will act as the central guardian of the legitimate use of force and will transform the prohibition into regulated collective action. However, this assumption depends on political consensus among the Council’s permanent members. In the absence of such consensus, the institutional mechanism designed to authorize and discipline the use of force becomes dysfunctional. This paralysis does not eliminate the fundamental security pressures facing states; rather, it shifts the decision-making process back to a unilateral level. In such contexts, states do not simply abandon the legal framework; they reinterpret it to compensate for institutional inaction.

Humanitarian intervention exemplifies this shift. In situations where mass atrocities are occurring and the Council is unable or unwilling to authorize action, some states have asserted the right to use force to prevent or halt widespread human suffering. Although not explicitly grounded in the Charter, this doctrine has been framed as morally compelling and, according to some views, as a legally emerging doctrine. However, its selective application and the absence of clear criteria highlight the doctrine’s permissive potential: by enabling unilateral use of force justified by contentious humanitarian claims, it effectively circumvents the collective authorization mechanism.

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine was, in part, an attempt to re-frame such concerns within an institutional framework by emphasizing the primacy of Security Council authorization. However, in practice, R2P has also contributed to the expansion of interpretive leeway. Once the threshold for mass atrocities is raised, debates typically shift from the question of whether the use of force is lawful to whether it is necessary, thereby softening the rigidity of the prohibition. In situations where the Council remains divided, the normative appeal of protection can be invoked to legitimize actions outside official authorization, blurring the line between regulation and permission.

Intervention upon invitation offers a different yet equally significant pathway. States have legitimized military intervention in ongoing conflicts—without appealing to the Security Council—by relying on the consent of a recognized government. Although this doctrine is formally grounded in sovereignty, it raises complex questions regarding the validity of consent, particularly in the context of civil wars or situations where governments lack effective territorial control. In such cases, the requirement for collective authorization is effectively circumvented, and the use of force is re-legitimized through bilateral or selective multilateral arrangements.

Similarly, collective self-defense has been interpreted in ways that extend beyond its original scope. States have invoked it not only in response to direct attacks against allies, but also in broader campaigns against non-state actors or widespread threats. This expansion, often combined with counterterrorism rhetoric, allows for coordinated use of force that, while formally grounded in Article 51, is functionally carried out with significant independence from Security Council oversight.

Finally, the persistence of preventive and preemptive doctrines further reinforces this trend. As previously discussed, these doctrines rely on broad interpretations of the concepts of threat and urgency, and the tendency to resort to them becomes more pronounced in the absence of effective collective mechanisms. In situations where the Council fails to act, the threshold for unilaterally determining necessity appears lower, thereby enabling states to legitimize the preemptive use of force under the guise of systemic necessity.

Taken together, these developments demonstrate how exceptions to the regulatory framework—originally designed to guide and constrain the use of force—can be transformed into alternative avenues of authorization. The Security Council’s failure to consistently fulfill its regulatory role does not create a legal vacuum; rather, it leads to the proliferation of justifications that reintroduce discretionary authority at the state level. In this way, institutional failure not only weakens the restrictive order but also actively contributes to the expansion of a parallel sphere of permission that coexists with the formal structure of the Charter system and occasionally undermines it.

What does the UN General Assembly’s Reluctance Indicate?

The limits of the regulatory framework regarding the use of force become even more evident when considered alongside the role of the United Nations General Assembly. Officially, the General Assembly has been granted certain residual powers regarding international peace and security, particularly in situations where the United Nations Security Council is unable to act. Through mechanisms such as the “Uniting for Peace” procedure, the General Assembly can propose collective measures, including the use of force, in exceptional circumstances. Thus, in the institutional design, the General Assembly appears as a potential corrective element—a mechanism through which the broader international community can compensate for the Security Council’s dysfunction.

Historically, the General Assembly has functioned as a central body expressing collective will at critical turning points in international politics. Landmark developments such as the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the negotiation and ratification of key multilateral treaties that form the foundation of international legal regimes, and a series of resolutions that accelerated the process of decolonization underscore the General Assembly’s normative and political significance. In this context, the General Assembly has acted not only as a forum for negotiation but also as a driving force for systemic transformation, shaping the evolution of international norms and institutions.

Yet this success stands in sharp contrast to its limited role in the use of force. Although the General Assembly possesses the procedural tools necessary to respond to threats to peace when the Security Council fails to act, it has consistently fallen short of assuming a decisive operational role. This reluctance is particularly striking in situations where humanitarian intervention is on the agenda, the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) requires broad-based international support, and the moral urgency of collective action is widely recognized. In such situations, the General Assembly has rarely gone beyond declaratory resolutions, failing to translate normative consensus into concrete recommendations that could guide or legitimize enforcement actions.

This pattern of institutional hesitation has significant consequences. Just as individual states resort to self-defense in a decentralized manner, the General Assembly’s reluctance—or inability—to act decisively contributes to the proliferation of lenient practices. In the absence of authoritative collective guidance, states and ad hoc coalitions are forced to interpret and apply controversial doctrines according to their own terms. The result is the proliferation of actions occurring outside the official regulatory framework, yet legitimized by reference to its fundamental principles.

Paradoxically, the General Assembly’s normative authority may further reinforce this effect. Since the General Assembly represents the broader international community, its silence or limited participation can be interpreted as tacit consent. In the absence of strong and coordinated opposition, practices that push the boundaries of the Charter or bypass them risk becoming normalized. Over time, this dynamic reinforces the erosion of restrictive rules not through formal legal changes, but through the accumulation of precedents that expand the boundaries of what is permissible.

In this sense, the General Assembly’s inability to effectively fill the vacuum created by the Security Council’s paralysis reflects, at the collective level, the dynamics observed in unilateral state practices. Both contribute to a gradual transformation of the legal environment: from a system focused on prohibition and regulation toward one where exceptions proliferate and permitted spheres expand. Thus, the General Assembly’s reluctance reveals a deeper structural constraint within the international order; that is, the existence of alternative institutional avenues does not guarantee their effective use. When both central authority and collective backup mechanisms fail, the restrictive framework governing the use of force becomes increasingly vulnerable to reinterpretation and erosion.