The Transformation of Constraints into Permissions (Part V)

By Cenap Çakmak

The above analysis can be reinforced by a broader observation: the legal regime governing the use of power becomes most stable when three elements converge: restrictive norms, effective institutional authorization, and political alignment among major powers. When one or more of these variables is absent, the system does not fall into a legal vacuum. Instead, it undergoes a transformation in which uncertainty is actively converted into permission through doctrines of justification. This process is triggered not only by the abuse of the framework of self-defense but also by the United Nations Security Council’s inability to act decisively and the United Nations General Assembly’s relative silence in the face of emerging violations.

This shift from restriction to permission is neither sudden nor accidental. It unfolds through interpretive practices, strategic legal arguments, and the construction of narratives of legitimacy. States rarely reject the law entirely; rather, they operate within the language of the law, expand its exceptions, and capitalize on their own silence. The decentralized nature of the concept of self-defense, combined with institutional paralysis and limited collective objection, creates a fertile ground for the gradual expansion of the permitted sphere.

However, moments of alignment demonstrate that the framework can function as intended. The response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait illustrates this point. The Security Council identified the aggression, authorized the use of force, and coordinated collective action. Here, restraint and regulation reinforced one another, and political legitimacy aligned with legal authorization. This event remains a touchstone for the effective functioning of the Charter system.

In contrast, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo marks a turning point where institutional failure led to a shift toward a controversial authorization. Despite the absence of explicit Security Council authorization, the intervention was justified on humanitarian grounds, and the claim was advanced that legality could be suspended in the face of paralysis and urgency. This was not a complete abandonment of the legal framework, but rather a circumvention of it through normative arguments. Kosovo’s legacy continues to shape debates on humanitarian intervention and demonstrates how failed regulations can create alternative avenues of justification.

The 2011 military intervention in Libya initially appeared to restore confidence in the system. The Security Council’s authorization provided a clear legal basis for action. However, the subsequent broad interpretation of the mandate for civilian protection created deep mistrust among major powers, particularly Russia and China. This contributed to subsequent deadlocks, demonstrating how even the officially successful applications of the framework can create long-term destabilizing effects.

Post-September 11 interventions have further highlighted the flexibility of the concept of self-defense. The US invasion of Afghanistan was widely framed as collective self-defense following the September 11 attacks. However, the 2003 invasion of Iraq stands as a paradigmatic example of abuse. Claims regarding weapons of mass destruction, combined with broad interpretations of the threat, have turned uncertainty into the basis for unilateral use of force. This event is particularly significant because it normalized a legal reasoning style in which controversial factual premises were deemed sufficient to legitimize military operations, thereby weakening the restrictive essence of the Charter regime.

A similar dynamic can be observed in the evolution of preventive self-defense doctrines, particularly in applications related to Israel. Such applications have gradually expanded the boundaries of legitimate force by advancing broader interpretations of the concepts of urgency and necessity. Although controversial, the repeated invocation of these concepts contributes to the reshaping of the legal framework’s boundaries, thereby reinforcing the permissive potential embedded within the self-defense framework.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine provides perhaps the clearest recent example of the law being used as a pretext for authorization. Russia’s justifications are based on a wide range of legal narratives, including claims of self-defense, the protection of citizens, collective defense linked to strategies, rhetoric about preventing genocide, and claims of historical rights. The significance of this case stems not so much from the credibility of these claims as from their very existence: even clearly unlawful attacks are articulated using legal language, underscoring the importance of legality as a source of political and diplomatic legitimacy.

More recent developments demonstrate even more clearly how the permissible scope continues to expand. The military actions the US has carried out against Iran have been justified through a combination of self-defense arguments—including the protection of forces and interests against imminent threats—and broader counterterrorism justifications. Such justifications typically rely on flexible interpretations of the concepts of proximity and necessity, reflecting earlier doctrinal expansions. Although framed within the language of Article 51, these actions demonstrate how the absence of clear and authoritative institutional responses—whether from the Security Council or the General Assembly—enables states to advance lenient justifications with limited constraints.

However, in some cases, this trend has gone even further, revealing that not only has the scope of interpretation broadened, but the relationship with legal justification has also become more flexible. The approach adopted by the United States in its conflicts with Iran—particularly under the Donald Trump administration—exemplifies this deviation. Unlike previous cases where the use of force was supported by broad legal arguments, the framework of justification here was distinctly weak, fragmented, and at times internally inconsistent. It was supported by—and at times overshadowed by—broader and more vague claims, including references to self-defense, the necessity of regime change, the improvement of the Iranian people’s welfare, and concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program. While these justifications may resonate politically, they do not fully align with established legal criteria governing the use of force, and invoking them reflects a willingness to operate at—or even beyond—the doctrinal limits of Article 51.

Equally significant is the overtly unilateral stance accompanying these actions. The US has not meaningfully sought authorization from international institutions nor presented its actions subject to collective approval. Instead, it has explicitly stated its readiness to act independently of the Security Council framework and has effectively sidelined the institutional mechanisms designed to regulate the use of force. This stance clearly deviates from the Charter’s emphasis on collective security and from previous practices where even controversial uses of force—at least officially—took place within multilateral processes.

Furthermore, the absence of a formally structured coalition further distinguishes this model. Rather than establishing a broad-based alliance or securing explicit multilateral support, the United States has primarily relied on temporary assistance and political backing from individual states. In contrast to institutionalized collective action, this loosely coordinated support model reinforces a shift toward a more individualized and discretionary approach to the use of force. This points to a structure where legitimacy is sought not through formal authorization but through selective compliance and ex post facto approval.

When these elements are considered together, they demonstrate that the “Trump-style” military approach remains an exception even within a broader model where exceptions have expanded. While previous cases typically involved the stretching of legal doctrines to meet strategic objectives, this example reveals that doctrinal consistency itself has been rendered relatively insignificant. The shift from carefully constructed legal arguments to more scattered and politically framed justifications signals that the constraints imposed by the legal framework have been further relaxed. In this sense, this approach not only expands the scope of authorization but also alters the conditions under which that scope is established, raising deeper questions about the sustainability of legality as a central regulatory principle in the governance of the use of force.

When considered as a whole, these examples reveal a consistent structural pattern. The abuse of the self-defense framework, the Security Council’s inability to act in politically contentious situations, and the General Assembly’s relative silence collectively contribute to the erosion of the restrictive regime. What emerges is not the disappearance of law, but its transformation: within a system where the use of force is prohibited, a de facto space for authorization is being recreated through an expanding array of exceptions, interpretations, and justifications.

From a scientific analytical perspective, this highlights a critical point. This shift from restriction to permission is not merely a matter of doctrinal change; it reflects the interaction between legal norms, institutional structures, and the politics of power. Even controversial or ill-intentioned legal claims retain their significance because they reveal the enduring role of law in shaping and legitimizing state behavior. The persistence of legal justification despite blatant violations confirms that international law continues to function; this function is realized not as an absolute constraint, but as a central arena where the limits of permissible use of force are constantly negotiated and redefined.

Policy Implications

The key policy lesson emerging from the above analysis is that strengthening the legal framework governing the use of force requires more than merely a rhetorical reaffirmation of existing norms. The problem is not the absence of law, but the fragility of the institutional structures through which that law is interpreted and applied. Therefore, meaningful reform must focus on strengthening mechanisms that maintain constraints and prevent them from being transformed into permissions. Furthermore, the norms and institutions designed to protect and sustain the legal framework governing the use of force must be vigorously defended and promoted not only by international bodies such as the UN General Assembly but also by individual states, independently of their national security priorities and military agendas; because what is tacitly permitted through silence will, over time and with the repetition of similar violations under the same conditions, evolve into an implicit agreement.

Reducing Decision-making Paralysis in the Security Council

The persistence of veto-induced paralysis in the United Nations Security Council remains the most significant structural factor leading to the transformation of restrictive law into permissive practice. As long as decisive action can be blocked by a single permanent member, the credibility of collective security is undermined, and the incentives for unilateralism increase. Addressing this requires targeted institutional reforms. These include encouraging voluntary restrictions on the veto in situations of mass atrocities, developing procedural expectations that require states to justify their use of the veto to the public, and strengthening escalation pathways—such as collective consultation—to the United Nations General Assembly in emergency situations . In parallel, more structured and consistent consultations with regional actors can help break the deadlock by broadening the political base for decision-making and increasing pressure for compromise.

Clarifying the Limits of Self-defense

The flexibility of Article 51 remains the primary doctrinal means of circumventing the prohibition on the use of force. Therefore, greater clarity is essential to prevent the concept of self-defense from being misused as a permissive justification. This requires states, courts, and legal bodies to make continuous efforts to improve and clarify the fundamental criteria governing self-defense. In particular, the concepts of urgency, necessity, and proportionality must be more clearly defined to limit broad interpretations. Another equally important issue is the development of more precise legal standards addressing the use of force against non-state actors, the application of self-defense in the context of cyber operations, and the conditions under which collective defense may be invoked. Without such clarification, the flexibility in the interpretation of Article 51 will continue to lead to divergent and often opportunistic applications.

Enhancing accountability regarding legal justification

Another policy priority is to address the increasing use of legal language as a strategic tool to legitimize controversial uses of force. Invoking self-defense or related doctrines should not be exempt from scrutiny merely because they are expressed in legal terms. Instead, the misuse of legal justifications must become a matter of institutional accountability. This can be advanced through the establishment of independent legal reporting mechanisms, greater use of advisory opinions by international judicial bodies, and more systematic fact-finding processes capable of evaluating the factual basis of self-defense claims. Such measures will not eliminate abuse, but they will increase the reputational and political costs associated with advancing weak or spurious legal arguments.

Strengthening regional security governance

In a system where global supranational authority remains limited, regional institutions can play a critical complementary role in strengthening accountability and stability. Strengthening regional security governance offers a pragmatic way to address some of the gaps left by global institutional constraints. Regional organizations can contribute by providing timely legal assessments of emerging crises, developing early warning mechanisms to identify escalating threats, facilitating the de-escalation of tensions through diplomatic channels, and conducting post-incident reviews of the use of force. Operating closer to the contexts in which conflicts arise, such institutions may be better positioned than global organizations to build consensus and intervene more nimbly.

Preserving the Distinction Between Ideal Law and Applied Law

Finally, effective policy design requires a clear distinction between law as an ideal normative framework and law as it is practiced in reality. Confusing these dimensions risks producing reforms that are either overly ambitious or insufficiently grounded in reality. Accepting this distinction fosters more realistic expectations regarding what international law can achieve, while also identifying where institutional improvements are most needed. Developing more robust and reliable mechanisms to regulate the use of force is precisely possible by acknowledging the gap between principle and practice.

Conclusion

The current crisis surrounding the use of force should not be understood as the sudden collapse of what was once a consistent, rule-based international order. Such a characterization risks exaggerating both the system’s past consistency and its current collapse. In reality, the legal order regulating the use of power has always been partial in scope, uneven in application, and deeply dependent on political compromise among major actors. Its operation has never been entirely legal; rather, it has consistently reflected the interplay between normative aspirations and geopolitical constraints. What appears today as a crisis is, in many respects, not a deviation from an otherwise stable equilibrium, but rather an intensification of long-standing structural tensions.

The prohibition on the unilateral use of force remains one of the most robust and widely recognized restrictive norms in international law. This norm continues to function as a fundamental principle shaping states’ behavior, diplomatic discourse, and institutional practices. However, its effectiveness in practice is never automatic. This norm is constantly influenced by the authority and functioning of institutions such as the United Nations Security Council, the interpretation strategies adopted by states, and the existence of legally recognized exceptions (most notably self-defense). The UN Charter has not eliminated the political nature of decisions regarding the use of force; rather, it has restructured this politics within a legal framework that oscillates between restriction, regulation, and authorization. This dynamic structure is of central importance for understanding both the resilience and the fragility of the system.

The central argument put forward in this analysis is that the apparent failure of the legal framework is best explained not by its erosion, but by its design. The system is constructed in such a way that moments of institutional inadequacy or interpretive expansion do not create a legal vacuum. Instead, they trigger a shift in how the law operates. When the Security Council is paralyzed, when self-defense is broadly interpreted, or when claims of humanitarian necessity are advanced outside the scope of collective authority, the framework adapts by reopening legally defined discretionary spaces. In these moments, the restriction does not disappear; it gives way to permission expressed and justified in legal terms. This capacity for internal transformation serves as both a source of continuity and a pathway for challenge.

This perspective helps explain why current cases—ranging from the NATO intervention in Kosovo and the 2011 military intervention in Libya to conflicts such as the Syrian war and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—should not be read as evidence of the irrelevance of international law. On the contrary, they demonstrate the enduring centrality of the legal argument. States continue to frame their actions in the language of legality because it remains indispensable for legitimacy. Legal justification plays a critical role in coalition-building, shaping international and domestic perceptions, managing reputational costs, and controlling diplomatic narratives. Even if legal claims are weak or contentious, the mere articulation of them underscores the foundational role of law in international politics.

Accordingly, the most effective policy response is not to defend an idealized vision of a fully realized, rule-based order, but to focus on improving the conditions under which restrictive law can function more effectively. This requires narrowing the scope of permissive reinterpretation by clarifying legal standards, reducing institutional paralysis—particularly within the Security Council—and strengthening accountability mechanisms against the misuse of legal doctrines. Rather than assuming that stronger norms alone will ensure compliance, policy efforts must address the institutional and political environments in which these norms are applied and debated.

In short, the future of the legal framework governing the use of force depends less on reaffirming abstract commitments to the prohibition and more on designing and reforming the institutions capable of upholding that prohibition in practice. The fundamental challenge lies in preserving the restrictive essence of the Charter system while managing recurring pressures to expand authorizations. Achieving this balance requires not only legal certainty but also institutional resilience and political will; without these, even the strongest norms face the risk of being constantly reinterpreted at the margins.